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The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Liberal Democratic or Authoritarian Regime? 
 
                  Solomon Terfa,  
      Mississippi Valley State University 
 
Abstract: The leaders of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia adopted their constitution on 
December 8, 1994. This analysis argues that the ethno-linguistic federal political system adopted by 
the founding members is problematic because the framers superimposed the constitution on the 
citizens dogmatically without thoroughly examining the country’s objective reality. Hence, the 
author contends that the ethnic federalist paradigm adopted in Ethiopia is diametrically opposed to 
the wishes and aspirations of the people as validated by a survey he conducted between 1992 and 
1993. He draws from this, perhaps the first and only study on this pertinent topic, to argue his case. 
The author also argues that the framers excluded the citizens from being represented at the 
constitution drafting convention by bona fide experts because they knew the people would neither be 
amenable to nor supportive of the political agenda the framers had designed. This reinforces the 
mutual mistrust between the citizens and the government. Inevitably, authoritarian rule was 
established.    
 
Keywords: Authoritarianism, ethno-linguistic federalism, Ethiopian people‘s revolutionary 




Ethiopia‘s political history has undergone centuries of authoritarian rule, much of   it marked by 
feudalism—embedded in the country‘s centuries-old monarchy—that was brought to end in 1974 by 
a ―Marxist‖ military dictatorship. The later lasted until 1991, when it was toppled by the current 
rulers of the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The Tigrean People‘s 
Liberation Front (TPLF), the dominant faction of the EPRDF representing the de facto ruling elites 
in Ethiopia today under an ethnically-based federal system, has since instituted a controversial nation 
building effort that stifled the democratic aspirations of the Ethiopian people; hence the focus of this 
study. 
Given the above backdrop, this study will show the constitutional framework of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which the TPLF superimposed on the country in December 1994, 
was an attempt to rule under the guise of democracy, while fulfilling the goal of perpetuating a 
minority control of Ethiopia‘s political and economic powerbase. Thus a case can be made that the 
ethno-linguistic federalist system adopted by the TPLF is not predicated on any empirical study or 
evidence. Rather, it is the dialectical offshoot of the longstanding Ethiopian students‘ infatuation 
with the ―Land to the Tiller‖ and the ―National Question‖ political slogan popular during the 1960s 
and 1970s when radical revolutionary ideas began to appear inconsequentially in the Ethiopian 
student movement. The theoretical and ideological underpinning of this call was Marxism-Leninism, 
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in which the conceptual roots of both slogans are found and the revered works of both Lenin and 
Stalin are accentuated. The TPLF leaders knew the whole time that most revolutionary and 
ideologically-oriented Ethiopians, particularly the educated ones, favored the Marxist-Leninist 
framework to solve the ―national/ethnic question‖ in Ethiopia, a political issue that had bedeviled the 
Horn of African country and dominated the debate within the Ethiopian students‘ movement during 
the imperial rule of the late Emperor Haile Selassie.  
This paper analyzes the motivation of the EPRDF for excluding those who were suspicious 
and mistrustful of its ultimate objective from the constitution drafting convention. The convention 
was a gathering of, on balance, ethnically based organizations that shared the TPLF/EPRDF‘s 
objective for establishing an ethno-linguistic federalism. In other words, majority of the Ethiopian 
people who would have opposed and resisted the establishment of an ethno-linguistic federalism 
were kept out or not represented by bona fide representatives.    
This analysis has five parts: (a) the mutual mistrust engendered between the   drafters of the 
Constitution and the people; (b) the questionable premise upon which the ethno-linguistic federalism 
paradigm was founded; (c) whether the constitution is a hybrid of Marxism-Leninism and liberal 
democracy; (d) the domination of the country by a single ethnic-based party; and (e) the extent of 
authoritarianism in Ethiopia under the TPLF/EPRDF rule.  
 
Why and When the Mutual Suspicion and Mistrust Began? 
 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was conceived and born in suspicion and 
mistrust held mutually between the founders of the FDRE and the people. This came to light when 
the TPLF was established as an exclusively Tigrean political party with the intention of liberating the 
province of Tigray and then seceding from Ethiopia. While waging its war against the then military 
junta, TPLF‘s publications, leaflets, and radio broadcasts had depicted or portrayed it as Marxist 
party of the Albanian type. In addition, upon its takeover of Addis Ababa in 1991, the actions and 
measures it took and some pronouncements its leaders made seem to have solidified the people‘s 
suspicions. Among others are:  
 the desecration of the national flag, the symbol and pride of Ethiopia‘s independence, by its 
trigger-happy soldiers; 
 the massacre of protestors who took to the streets to  express not only their opposition to the 
desecration but also their love for and loyalty to the flag; 
 the trashing of Ethiopian Air Line (EAL), regarded as national pride in African aviation; 
 Meles‘s sarcastic challenge made to his political opponents  ―mengedun cherq yaragilatchu” 
(a bon voyage equivalent to those who were considering the military route) during his 
nationally televised discussion with three prominent intellectuals, Professors Mesfin Wolde 
Mariam, Andreas Eshete, and Makkonen Bishaw; 
 the caricaturing of the Addis Ababa University as a bastion of chauvinist and petty-bourgeois 
reactionaries that was willing to send its students to the war front; 
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 the continued echoing of the Eritrean People‘s Liberation Fronts‘ claim that ―Eritrea was a 
colony of Ethiopia‖ by Meles and the TPLF leadership and the    enthusiastic support they 
gave not only to the ―Eritreans-only-referendum‖ but also the invitation they extended to the 
OAU and the UN to observe the process and give credence and legitimacy to the outcome of 
the whole exercise; 
 the expulsion of 42 professors and 18 medical doctors from the Addis Ababa    University 
and the Army hospital, respectively. 
Given this backdrop, it can be reasonably argued that the massacre that took place   during the ill 
fated national Election of 2005 was a desperate reaction to power slipping out of the hands of the 
regime. It could also be surmised as a manifestation of the bottled up resentment to the suspicion the 
people had harbored. This author, therefore, contends that it is this mistrust and suspicion that 
constrained the government from inviting the people to be represented by genuine and bona fide 
peoples‘ representative to participate in the deliberation and ratification of the Constitution it 
authored when the Constituent Assembly met in 1994. As indicated in the African Elections 
Database, Elections in Ethiopia (2002) which was also corroborated by the government‘s 1995-2005 
statistics, of the 547 representatives, 484 belonged to the Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Forces 
(EPRDF). Edmond J. Keller sarcastically remarked:  
Elections for a constituent assembly to approve a new democratic constitution took place in 
1994. All registered political parties could participate and, indeed, 39 did participate. 
However, the outcome could have been predicted. Member organizations of the EPRDF won 
484 of 547 seats. The EPRDF had the advantage of incumbency and a wealth of resources at 
its disposal, including patronage with which it could co-opt opposition leaders (Keller 2002, 
30).   
This action by the government might have, perhaps, reinforced the people‘s doubt about its 
motives, sincerity, and vision. Why in the world would a government that purports to establish a 
federal, democratic and representative form of government exclude the people from participation? 
Should not the people be allowed to have an input in what the government should look like before 
they agree to its establishment and become bounded by a constitutional document? Why should a 
government that declares that ―sovereignty resides in the nation, nationality, and peoples of Ethiopia‖ 
(Article 8, section 1 of the Constitution) prevent the supposed owners and beneficiaries of the-
would-be government from participating in its conception and birth, so to speak? Were the authors of 
the constitution afraid that they would encounter difficulty in convincing the people that they, the 
people, are not Ethiopians first but rather Amharas, Oromos, Tigreans, Gurages first and Ethiopians 
second? 
If this supposition were to be true and if that was what the founding members of the FDRE 
were afraid of, then it might be logical to assume that it would also be difficult to convince the 
people of the need to include Article 39 of the Constitution, which guarantees every nation, 
nationality, or people in the country ―the unrestricted right to self determination up to secession.‖  
Assuming that this supposition is true and that secession is what the authors of the constitution had 
wanted, then it would also be logical to assume that the people would have had difficulty in 
conceding to Article 46, section 2 of the constitution that delineates the boundaries of the states 
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taking language as the main criterion.  
 
The Questionable Premise 
The ―self-determination including secession‖ premise upon which the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia is founded is fallacious. It is modeled on Lenin‘s and Stalin‘s work on how to resolve the 
national question of Czarist Russia. The Ethiopian Marxist Leninists (EMLs here after) never took 
time to ask a very pertinent question. That is, if Lenin and Stalin were genuinely interested in 
resolving the national question of Russia, why had they not live up to their promise and allow the 
various oppressed nationalities in Czarist Russia to self-determine and secede instead of establishing 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and force them to be part of ? It is the contention of many that 
the lives of the various nationalities under Stalin had continued to be as hellish as they had ever been 
under Czarist Russia (Kowalski 2008).  
It has been pointed out that the constructive policies adopted by Lenin towards the various 
nationalities in 1920s, allowing them to develop their own cultures, religions, and languages, were 
reversed by Stalin. These policies toward the nationalities were reversed in the 1930s when Stalin 
achieved dictatorial control of the Soviet Union. Stalin‘s watchwords regarding nationalities were 
centralism and conformity. Although Georgian, Stalin pursued a policy of drawing other nationalities 
closer to the Russian nationality. He looked toward Russian culture and language as the links that 
would bind different nations together, creating in the process a single Soviet people who would not 
only speak Russian but also for all intents and purposes be Russian. Native communist elites were 
purged and replaced with Russians or thoroughly Russified persons. Teaching the Russian language 
in all schools became mandatory… self-governing powers of the republics were curtailed. 
Nationalities were brutally suppressed by such means as the forced famine of 1932-33 in the 
Ukrainian Republic and the northern Caucasus and the wholesale deportations of nationalities during 
World War II, against their constitutional rights (Zickel 1989, 1-2).  
This part needed a long quotation because the EMLs were oblivious to this dark history of the 
various nationalities under the person ―who promised them heaven and gave them hell.‖ It appears 
that the finding of the Leninist-Stalinist ―method of solving the nationalities problem‖ a la ―self-
determination including secession‖ was, to the EMLs, their ―eureka moment.‖ They hoped and 
believed that this would be the ―silver bullet‖ that would relieve Ethiopia of its long standing 
problem. Another problem that was overlooked by the EMLs was that by championing the 
nationalities questions, the Bolsheviks would not only hasten the demise of the regime of the Czar 
but also ingratiate themselves with the various nationalities. And it had worked. Again the 
ramification of this tactic was not given serious thought by the EMLs.  
Among the core of Ethiopian Marxist-Leninists (EMLs), Wallelign was one of them. He was 
not only the first to define what a nation is, in the Ethiopian context, but also the first to articulate 
and categorically state that Ethiopia is composed of many nationalities. He asserted that Ethiopia is, 
contrary to traditional belief, composed of many national groupings with their own peculiarities and 
idiosyncrasies. He contended that these nations should be given not only the right to participate in 
state affairs, but also the right to develop their language, music, and history and secede if they so 
4
African Social Science Review, Vol. 5 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol5/iss1/10




desire, provided they are led by peasants and workers who are conscious of their historic 
internationalist obligations. It was his firm belief that socialist movements will, in the long run, 
remain faithful to their internationalism and unite with other nations of the same conviction led by 
their peasants and workers (Van der Beken 1996, 5).  
However, the pertinent question to ask is the motivation behind Wallelign‘s radical 
pronouncement and call for the destruction of Ethiopia as we know it. It is based on the conviction, I 
dare to opine, that the nations, as he likes to refer to them, were oppressed and exploited by the 
ruling nation and that their redemption could only be obtained by turning Ethiopia into a socialist 
society that will respect and protect their rights. Following Wallelign‘s daring contention, many 
scholars, Marxist Leninists and otherwise, began  not only to echo and amplify his call but also to 
use it as a paradigm in their study of Ethiopian politics. This became the norm both in the 1960s‘ 
student movement and in the works and speeches of several Ethiopian political observers (Van der 
Beken 1996; Gudina 2002; Habtu 2003 and Hameso 2001). 
Chris Van der Beken holds Emperor Menelik, a Shoan Amhara and an Orthodox Christian, 
who assumed the throne in 1989, responsible for expanding the Abyssinian/Ethiopian heartland to 
the South, East, and West. The conquered people not only lost their land and political power, but also 
their culture, language, religion, traditions, history, and way of life. It goes without saying therefore 
that the unequivocal assimilation of the conquered people in terms of their culture, religion, and 
language into the Amhara culture became the required path to develop career within the state. Van 
der Beken also suggests that the independence struggle that began in Eritrea in 1960s and the 
rebellion in the south-eastern province of Bale where Somali and nascent Oromo nationalism were 
observed were all the result of dissatisfaction with Amhara domination (Van der Beken 1996, 2-3).   
The EMLs used the above argument as justification for advocating Lenin‘s and Stalin‘s 
method of resolving the nationalities question. However, the dysfunctional nature of the institutions 
of the imperial government and their failure to attend to people‘s needs and the revolt of the people 
against these anachronistic and ill equipped institutions had been misconstrued by the EMLs as 
having to do with the national question. The principle of intellectual courage would have demanded 
from these EMLs and their foreign intellectual and/or ideological collaborators to offer a realistic 
assessment of Ethiopian conditions devoid of Marxist-Leninist dogmas. For instance, they labeled 
the Bale and Ethiopian Somales‘ uprisings during the 1960s as nascent nationalism when it was 
simply an opposition to taxation. The late Harold Marcus, perhaps one of the most respected 
American historians on Ethiopia, narrates the uprising as follows:  
The government also used force in Bale and Sidamo between 1963 and 1970 to put down 
arebellion among Oromo farmers and Somali herders. Their struggle against new land and 
animal taxes inevitably became involved with the politics of Greater Somalia, a circumstance 
that caused the government in late 1966 to order the army to intervene. By then, the rebels 
controlled southern Bale and southeastern Sidamo and were attacking northern districts at 
will, though the Somalis and Oromo were disunited and did not even attempt coordination. 
Broadcasting to both groups, Radio Mogadishu stressed the need for Muslim unity against 
the Amhara, including the Oromo in the framework of Somali nationalism. The Oromo 
remained unconvinced, and in early 1967 the army, now two brigades strong, had little 
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difficulty in pacifying the rebellion in Sidamo….By early 1970, the rebellion sputtered out, 
and the emperor visited the region to inform the people that their taxes would henceforth be 
invested in development projects.  
….The Eritrean and Bale challenges revealed that the Ethiopian government had not 
undertaken social and economic programs sufficient to win the allegiance of the people. 
There were no political parties that could generate competing agenda for action, and 
parliament remained very much under the control of landlords. It was impossible for the 
institution seriously to consider bills that reformed land tenure, controlled rents, or levied 
taxes on the rich. By default, therefore, force became the only tool of social control, partly 
because the emperor had grown reliant on the military but also because his government was 
inherently weak (Marcus 1994 178-179). 
It is obvious that most of the countries in the world are multinational. They are composed of different 
peoples with different languages, cultures, values, histories etc. The paramount and very pertinent 
question in this connection is how did these multinational countries come into being? This question 
goes to the essence of the debate here. What is clear is that no supernatural being had any say or a 
hand in the creation of the United States of America, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, the 
former Soviet Union, Switzerland, et cetera. These countries are the result of the dialectical 
development of human progress. Wars of expansion and annexation, colonialism and imperialism are 
all part and parcel of this dialectical development of human progress. Most of the European countries 
with their clearly defined boundaries are product of the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1618-1648). The countries of Africa are also, in most part, the creation of colonial 
powers. Martin Meredith in his book, The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, 
succinctly describes Africa‘s territorial makeup as nation states or multinational entities as follows:  
During the Scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, European powers staked 
claims to virtually the entire continent. At meetings in Berlin, Paris, London and other 
capitals, European statesmen and diplomats bargained over the separate spheres of interest 
they intended to establish….The maps used to carve up the African continent were mostly 
inaccurate; large areas were described as terra incognita. When marking out the boundaries 
of their new territories, European negotiators frequently resorted to drawing straight lines on 
the map, taking little or no account of the myriad of traditional monarchies, chiefdoms and 
other African societies that existed on the ground. Nearly one half of the new frontiers 
imposed on Africa were geometric lines, lines of latitude and longitude, other straight lines 
or arcs of circles. In some cases, African societies were rent apart….In all the new boundaries 
cut through some 190 culture groups. In other cases, Europe‘s new colonial territories 
enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups, with no common history, culture, 
language or religion. Nigeria, for example, contained as many as 250 ethno linguistic groups 
(Meredith 2005, 1-2).            
Then the question to the EMLs and their foreign collaborators is that what   international law did 
Ethiopia‘s Emperor Menilek break in expanding the country‘s territories to the south and south east? 
Any objective narration and analysis of the history and politics of the region and that of Menilek‘s 
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expansion should be discussed within contexts and perspectives, that is, the scramble for Africa and 
the threat it posed to the sovereignty and independence of Ethiopia. It should take the colonial 
ambition of Britain, France, and Italy in the region into consideration. Harold Marcus observed:  
From 1896 to 1907, Menilek directed Ethiopia‘s return into southern and western regions 
abandoned in the seventeenth century and into areas never before under his rule….The 
European threat to the Ethiopian periphery worried Menilek enough to order Ras Makonnen 
westward into Beni (or Bela) Shangu country. The imminence of British rule in Sudan gave 
urgency to the acquisition of the gold producing area....Meanwhile, Menilek had ordered 
forces to move into what were to become the empire‘s extreme peripheries, especially 
Borena, directly in the path of British expansion northward from Kenya….Between 1896 and 
1906, Ethiopia expanded to its present size, comprising the highlands, the key river systems, 
and a borderland buffer zone in low-lying, arid, or tropical zones to protect the state‘s central 
core (Marcus 1994, 104-105).  
Historically, conquest and annexation were the norm upon which multinational states were created. 
The founders of the Organization of African Unity, now the African Union, upon establishing their 
organization in 1963 were cognizant of this complex and very intricate nature of the colonial 
boundaries that created the African countries. They therefore agreed to include a provision in their 
Charter that called for all nations to accept territorial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers.  
It is reasonable to assume that Wallelign and all his EML comrades were fully aware of this 
world and African historical facts. If this assumption is correct, then why could they not be critical 
and consider the ramifications of imposing foreign ideology and   paradigm to solve a problem they 
created in their own minds? The principle of intellectual courage requires that researchers be 
objective in their analysis. Unfortunately, this was not case with the EMLs. The paradigm they 
prescribed for Ethiopia is intellectually lazy and hence indefensible. It lacked rigor and originality. It 
encouraged mechanically transplanting a deceitful and disingenuous policy that has no relevance to 
the Ethiopian situation. It is deceitful because it does mean what it says.          
An objective assessment and analysis of Ethiopia‘s socio-political situation would have 
shown that a large majority of Ethiopians were proud of to Ethiopians. A 1992   survey conducted 
among 650 university and high school students from eight different regions of the country: Addis 
Ababa, Bale, Gojjam, Gidole, Kembata, Arssi, Wolaita, and Gamu Gofa (Terfa 1993, 5-21), not only 
illustrates this very vividly, but also contradicts Prime Minister Meles‘ contention that ethnic 
federalism is ―the only solution to the century old oppression under centralist government and one 
ethnic domination of culture, language, politics and economy‖ (Zenawi 2009, 6).  
Eighty percent of the respondents consider themselves primarily Ethiopians and seventy five 
percent of them clearly expressed their opposition to taking language as a criterion to delineating the 
provinces of the federal state. In addition, sixty five percent of the respondents thought the absence 
of democracy and the political domination of the country by authoritarian leaders were the premier 
problems in Ethiopia rather than the national question as the drafters of the constitution asserted 
(Terfa 1993, 13). The study also unmasks the erroneous claim of the leaders of the ethnically based 
liberation movements that they represent the wishes of their people. Contrary to their belief, what is 
at the heart of Ethiopia‘s problem is the absence of political freedom and democracy. The national 
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question or the ―ethnic disharmony‖ is rather the creation of the EPRDF and thus alien to Ethiopian 
politics. If at all, it was a hypothesis or a theoretical construct that had not been proven in the case of 
Ethiopia. The leaders of the liberation movements decided that it was a national issue and thus took 
up arms. However, it cannot be denied that there were culturally subjugated, politically oppressed 
and economically exploited people in the history of the country.  
Yet the people have lived together long enough to enable them to transcend their ethnic 
consciousness and/or narrow nationalism and adopt Ethiopian way of life.  Otherwise how would 
one explain the fact that eighty percent of the survey respondents say they are Ethiopians first? In 
addition, 80.9 percent of them said neither the government of Emperor Haile Sellasie nor that of 
Colonel Mengistu was exclusively dominated by the Amhara ethnic group (Terfa 1993, 9). Eighty six 
percent of them disagreed that the two governments were dominated by a coalition of Amhara-Tigre 
ethnic groups (Terfa 1993, 10). Seventy four percent of the respondents agreed on the inclusive 
nature of the two governments (Terfa 1993, 11).                           
The following two anecdotes clearly show the chasm between the ethnically based liberation 
movement leaders and the people. The first one is about Mr. Wondimu Tchebero, a person of Dorze 
ethnic background, one of the many ethnic groups that had been forcefully incorporated into the 
―Ethiopian empire‖ by Menilek, who lamented over the government‘s policy that forced his children 
to learn in their mother tongue, namely Dorzigna. Mr. Wondimu narrated his complaint to Mr. 
Tesfaye Gebre Ab, who had once served in Prime Minister Meles‘ administration as Department 
Head in the Ministry of Information. Mr. Wondimu began his complaint by criticizing the education 
policy of the government that perpetrated a double standard. He regretted the fact that the children of 
government officials, including that of the Prime Minister, are being taught in English while the 
children of the downtrodden are being taught in their mother tongue. Did Meles not claim, Mr. 
Wondimu recalled, that among his reasons for picking up arms and going to the bush was the fact 
that he was forced by the previous governments to be taught in Amharic? Was this not the claim of 
all of the current leaders?  ―Now that they have the power, why are they not making their children the 
beneficiaries of the fruit of their struggle?‖ he sarcastically asked (Gebre Ab 2009, 129). 
 As far as he is concerned, he wanted his children to be taught in Amharic so that they could 
find a job. He does not want, he continued to say, his children to be condemned to be shemanewotch, 
i.e., traditional weavers, a profession stereotypically and negatively associated with his ethnic group. 
This daring and public declaration of Mr. Wondimu had made him popular, almost an icon, amongst 
his people indicating the fact that his ethnic group does not share the claim of the former guerrillas 
who now find themselves in power (Gebre Ab 2009, 128-131). 
The second anecdote is about Mr. Ephrem Boru, an Oromo from Wallega, and a member of 
another ―oppressed ethnic group.‖ Mr. Ephrem was a very prominent Oromo who had served the 
government of Emperor Haile Selassie in various capacities in the 1960s. Among the position Boru 
served include plenipotentiary Ambassador to Ghana early in the 1960s when President was still the 
president of Ghana. 
In the 1990s every Saturday my father used to pay a visit to his good friend to catch up and 
socialize. On one particular Saturday in 1991, I had to give my father a ride the Ambassador‘s 
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residence before I could borrow his car. When we arrived at the residence, the Ambassador invited 
me in and I accepted the invitation thinking it would only be for a short while. That short while 
turned out to be three hours, almost as much time as Nkrumah had spent explaining his dream to 
him. At the outset, the Ambassador said to me that he had some important matter to share with me. It 
was about his disappointment in some of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) leaders who had sent his 
younger brother to invite him to attend their meetings. He expressed his disappointment on two 
grounds. First, he said that ―he had lived all his life as an Ethiopian and now the OLF wanted him to 
renounce this identity.‖  Second, he said ―it was his understanding that the OLF consider Amharic as 
a colonial language.‖ Amharic then and still is government sanctioned national language. 
 The anguish on his face was visible when he continued to say ―I just could not reconcile this 
with Nkrumah‘s dream of making Amharic the language of Africa.‖ Although he was stoically 
fighting his tears, the lump in his throat betrayed him. His voice began to crack. He began to stutter 
and stammer. I could also see the anguished pain in my father‘s face. It was a ―hell‖ of a scene for 
me watching these two Oromo gentlemen in their 80s and late 70s respectively being tormented by 
Oromo children who took the liberty to speak on behalf of all the Oromos. I sat there, for a while, 
speechless and contemplating what I should say or do. Then I asked the Ambassador if would be 
willing to come to the University of Addis Ababa, formerly Haile Selassie University, and share his 
story with my students. I informed him that I was the chairman of the department of Political Science 
and International Relations and that I could arrange for him to come and speak. 
 Unfortunately he said he could not come because of his heart problem. It then occurred to me 
that he had a heart pacer implant. Then I asked him what he wanted me to do with the information, 
he proceeded to tell me that ―he did not want to take it to his grave with him.‖ It was clear to me that 
the Ambassador had wanted to keep his anecdote with President Nkrumah alive and be part of his 
legacy. I will, therefore, take the liberty to paraphrase it as follows. It is to be remembered that 
Nkrumah, a Pan-African in college, was one of the few and original advocates of African Unity. 
After his effort to establish the United States of Africa was torpedoed by the Casa Blanca and 
Monrovia groups, he settled for the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 with 
the help of, among others, Emperor Haile Selassie. 
 On the day the Ambassador presented his appointment credential to President Nkrumah, the 
latter, taking almost three hours of his time, related to him his admiration of the Emperor, his 
contribution to the establishment of the OAU, and most importantly the significance of Ethiopia‘s 
independence from colonial rule. Ethiopia, he noted, had been the symbol of black pride in Africa in 
particular and black people of the world in general. Nkrumah then told the Ambassador that Africa 
would need one common language. English and French were out of the question for him for they are 
colonial languages. Arabic was also out because did not think the Arabs consider themselves 
Africans. And then he thought of Swahili as a possible language, but then remembered that it did not 
have its own script. 
 Nkrumah, then enthusiastically, said that if the whole of Africa would begin teaching 
Amharic then, in fifteen to twenty years, he projected Africa might be able to develop a language that 
would help it fulfill its dream and establish the United States of Africa. Ambassador Boru told me 
that he was overwhelmed and humbled by Nkrumah‘s dream. He said ―that was one of the giants of 
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the Organization of African Unity.‖ The Ambassador then concluded his reminiscence by saying ―he 
would never be able to reconcile Nkrumah‘s dream of wanting Amharic to be the language of Africa 
and OLF‘s contention that Amharic is a colonial language.‖        
I think it is a very opportune moment for me to share this with my readers. These two 
anecdotes and the responses of the 650 students that were surveyed profoundly express the bottled-
up frustration of the people towards the so-called liberation front‘s and by extension to those who 
have established the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia by superimposing it on a people 
whose socio-economic and political evolution is much different from that of Czarist Russia. This is 
why this writer argues that the ethno-linguistic federalism paradigm is fallacious.           
 
Why the Constitution of the FDRE is a Hybrid of Marxism-Leninism and Liberal Democracy 
To those who read with thought and purpose the hybrid nature of the constitution is evident. The 
question then becomes why? The authors of the constitution are Marxist-Leninists. This is a given. It 
is also a given fact that among their intentions is the ―liberation of oppressed nationalities‖ in the 
country. So why is the Marxist-Leninist aspect of the constitution, the most pertinent aspect of the 
document to the authors and power brokers, being intentionally subsumed within and/or 
camouflaged by the overwhelming liberal-democratic aspect of the constitution? The simple truth is, 
it is done to win the support of donor countries and institutions like the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and also the leaders of Western liberal democratic countries. No 
wonder, therefore, that the World Bank wrote the following in its 1999 report. It read:   
Ethiopia has embarked on a bold and thoughtful process of decentralization, which has been 
supported by a widely shared consensus over both the development strategy and objectives 
and very large transfers of united resources from the federal government to the regions. It 
concluded by saying, ‗at this point the system is unquestionably working well‘ (Keller 2002, 
33).  
 Keller pointing out the short comings or gullible nature of organizations like the World Bank, donor 
institutions, and specialized agencies of the United Nations said: 
 By the standard of public administration, this would seem to be the case. However, there is a 
political dimension that organizations like the World Bank and other international 
development agencies seem to ignore or simply downplay. Ethnic federalism has not resulted 
in a widespread consensus in the general population of Ethiopia (Keller 2002, 33). 
To the authors of the Ethiopian constitution, adherence to Marxism-Leninism is not only a question 
of practicality, but also of adherence, allegiance and loyalty. This is because the nuclei of the Tigray 
People‘s Liberation Front were members of the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray, an exclusive club 
dominated by Meles and his close friends. It is this group that dominated not only the Transitional 
Government but also the constituent assembly that drafted the constitution. Aregawi Berhe, former 
member of the leadership of the TPLF, succinctly put it this way: 
In 1985 a party, officially known as the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) was 
established within the TPLF, Meles Zenawi as its chief ideologue. In its constitution, this 
party declared that…MLLT, as the core of the future Ethiopian Marxist Leninist Party, is the 
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only correct party free from all sort of revisionism (Trotskyism, Maoism…) that could 
constitute a proletarian-peasant dictatorship to liberate the Ethiopian people (Berhe 2009, 5).  
 In his April 3 and 5, 1990 interview with Paul B. Henze, Meles Zenawi tried to allay the fears of this 
former American government official and through him the then American administration and the 
Congress of the United States by saying the following: 
We are not a Marxist-Leninist movement. We do not apply Marxism-Leninism in Tigray. 
The name of our organization does not include any reference to Marxism –Leninism. We do 
have Marxists in our movement. [I acknowledge that. I, myself, was a convinced Marxist 
when I was a student at Haile Selassie Ist University] in the early 1970s and our movement 
was inspired by Marxism]. But we have learned that dogmatic Marxism-Leninism is not 
applicable in the field. We do not believe that any foreign system can be imposed on a 
country (Henze 1990, 3; emphasis mine).   
What else would he say on the eve of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe? He was fully aware that communism was being eclipsed by liberal 
democracy and capitalism and that the balance of power was shifting in favor of the United States 
and its allies. Hence, in order to obtain the uncritical support of the United States, the sole 
superpower, and also its Western allies, Meles had to say exactly that. Henze, therefore, did not 
hesitate to give Meles a piece of his mind. He noted: ―Because you have called yourselves Marxists 
so often…. You yourself have been quoted as saying that you accept Albania as an ideal model for 
the future Ethiopia. There have been numerous reports of praise of Stalin…but it has caused great 
disquiet among serious people who are concerned about Ethiopia.‖  
When Henze pressed him on his admiration of Albania, Meles had no compunction about 
denying. He said…―We are not trying to apply an Albanian system. We are not trying to apply a 
Soviet system or a Chinese system. We know the Albanians are also changing some features of their 
system” (Henze 1990. ibid, emphasis mines).  
Meles may want to deny but his pronouncement are on paper and, therefore, cannot be wished away. 
What exactly did he say in 1989? His former friend in the TPLF Aregawi Berhe wrote: 
In an interview with The Independent, at the end of 1989, the present Prime Minister of 
Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, asserted that the ‗Soviet Union and other Eastern Europe bloc 
countries have never been truly socialist. The nearest any country comes to being socialist as 
far as we are concerned is Albania…To him, as was clearly maintained in the same 
interview, only his party could lead to a fully democratic state. Aregawi continued  
The officially published program and declarations of the MLLT and TPLF are no longer 
visible since Zenawi joined the camp of the US....Eclectic as it appears, Zenawi’s policies 
have drawn the whole country into a state of  chaos and confusion, because of the 
incompatibility between what he thinks and what he does (Berhe 2009, 5, emphasis mine).    
It is therefore evident that Meles has tried to marry two diametrically opposed philosophies, 
Marxism-Leninism and liberal democracy, in the constitution of the FDRE. It should be stated that 
these two philosophies provide different approaches to solving problems between people and also 
between the people and governments.  
For liberal democracy, the right of the individual is paramount and, therefore, should not be 
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subordinated to the right of a group or a collective. In a liberal democracy, the problem of the 
individual or groups of individuals will be solved within the framework of   democratic governance 
where the rights, privileges, responsibilities and obligations of the individual are enshrined in the 
constitution. If and when there is a discrepancy or inconsistencies or even contradictions between 
what the constitution promises or offers and how the government of the time interprets the 
constitution, designs and implements its policies to favor one person over another or one group of 
people over the other, then the aggrieved person or groups of persons can address their grievances to 
the courts.   
In this connection, the dialectical development of the political history of the African 
Americans in the United States is an eloquent testimony of how far they have come within the 
framework of a liberal democracy. It is a vivid and painful memory that the Constitution of the 
United States had once regarded them as slaves, and therefore property (Dye and Zeigler, 2009, 32) 
then 3/5
th
 of a human being before it  granted them full citizenship (Thirteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution).  I hasten to add that the passage of the various Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act 
of the 1950s and 1960s, have contributed either to consolidating and/or expanding the gains that had 
been made. It is also a historical fact that the founders of the constitution did not initially allow 
suffrage to women (Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution) and property-less white men 
(Dye and Zeigler 2009, 55). All these have been corrected and rectified by constitutional amendment 
and/or taking it to the courts for their rulings.    
How about the Civil War in the United States? Was it not a question of secession, one may 
ask? The Civil War of 1860 was a lot different from this. The ten states that opted for secession and 
took up arms were not willing to deal with the problem through legal or constitutional means. The 
issue that led to their would-be secession was what to make of the western states. That was the bone 
of contention between the northern states and the southern states. The southern states wanted the 
western states to be their replica: cotton growers with slave culture, while the northern states 
preferred them to be producers of raw materials and market for their products. These were two 
diametrically opposed positions that could not be reconciled (Dye and Zeigler 2009, 56-57). The 
position taken by President Abraham Lincoln, a man who was not known as an abolitionist was, 
however, against its expansion to the western states. He said: 
The whole nation is interested that the best use shall be made of these territories. We want 
them for homes and free white people. This they cannot be, to any considerable extent, if 
slavery shall be planted within them (ibid). 
Hence, Lincoln‘s decision to go to war against the secessionist states was primarily to keep the 
Union. It goes without saying that this is a responsibility that is bestowed upon the president by the 
constitution. Marxism-Leninism, on the other hand, is a philosophy or an ideology that gives primacy 
or precedence to groups or classes in Marxist parlance. The rights and demands of the individual 
have to be subordinated to the interest of the class. Hence the division of society into classes. In the 
slave society, the contradiction is between the slaves and the slave owners. In a feudal society, it is 
between feudal lords and serfs. In the capitalist society, it is between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat or the working class. In a multinational empire, it is between the oppressor nation and the 
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oppressed nations and/or nationalities. All these contradictions are resolved through class struggle 
with the proletariat as the vanguard.  
It is this approach to solving the problem of nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia that is 
contained in Article 39 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is to be remembered that 
Meles had claimed that he was not a Marxist. He had also asserted that they do not apply Marxism-
Leninism in Tigray. So, where did Article 39 come from? The Article did not somehow, by some 
inexplicable miracle or divine intervention, incorporate itself into the constitution and/or insist and 
plead to be incorporated. It is in Lenin‘s thesis that one will find not only the application of the 
concept of ―self-determination that includes secession‖ but also the delineation of boundaries 
respecting national composition.  
It was an open secret that Lenin regarded Czarist Russia as a ―prison house of nations.‖ As a 
Marxist, he was convinced that the liberation of these nations and nationalities had to be tied and 
linked to the struggle and liberation of the proletariat. Rob Sewell in his article entitled ―Lenin on the 
National Question‖ observed:  
Following on from Marx, Lenin took up the national question as a means of arming the 
revolutionary social democracy in Russia and uniting the oppressed nationalities under the 
banner of the working class. In answer to national oppression, the Russian Marxists…called 
for the right of nations to self-determination, that is, to complete separation as states. This 
was particularly relevant to tsarist Russia, whose empire constituted a ‗prison house of 
nationalities.‘ Such was the make-up of the empire that the Great Russians, the ruling 
nationality, only constituted 48% of the whole. Those under domination (Poles, Lithuanians, 
Estonians, Finns, Letts, Ukrainians, and so on), deprived of their rights, were systematically 
oppressed by tsarism. It was this that gave the national question in Russia such an explosive 
force (Sewell 2004, 2).       
This inevitably brought objections from Rosa Luxemburg, Bukharin and others who felt that 
Lenin was abandoning and forgoing the natural alliance of the working class of the different 
nationalities and advocating secession for its own sake. Lenin‘s advocacy for the right of the various 
nationalities was, however, intended to weaken ―…bourgeois nationalism and winning the 
confidence of the workers of the oppressed nation….‖ (ibid). Otherwise he had emphatically argued 
that Marxists do not support every call for self-determination unless and until it is believed that it 
will advance the struggle for socialism and the liberation of the proletariat. In his Collected Works, 
Lenin declared: 
However our unreserved recognition of the struggle for freedom of self-determination does 
not in any way commits us to supporting every demand for national self-determination. As 
the party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party considers it to be its positive and 
principal task to further the self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather 
than that of peoples or nations. We must always and unreservedly work for the very closest 
unity of the proletariat of all nationalities (Lenin 1903, 243-251). 
Hence it is in the above quotation that one finds the answer to why Meles is waging a war against the 
Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden Liberation Front, two organizations whose leaders had long 
left the government of Prime Minister Meles‘ after accusing it of not being any different from the 
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Haile Selassie‘s autocratic regime or from the Stalinist military junta of Colonel Mengistu, and 
demanding that their people be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination as guaranteed to 
them by Article 39 of the constitution.  
 Meles‘ idea of delineating the boundaries and apportioning territories to the various 
nationalities is derived from Lenin‘s suggestion. Lenin said: 
The proletariat cannot achieve freedom other than by revolutionary struggle for the 
overthrow of the tsarist monarchy and its replacement by a democratic republic. The tsarist 
monarchy precludes liberty and equal rights for nationalities… This monarchy can be 
overthrown only by the united proletariat of all the nations of Russia….Social-Democrats 
demand the abolition of the old administrative divisions of Russia established by the feudal 
landowners and the civil servants of the autocratic feudal state and their replacement by 
divisions based on the requirements of present-day economic life in accordance, as far as 
possible, with the national composition of the population. All areas of the state that are 
distinguished by social peculiarities or by the national composition of the population, must 
enjoy wide self-government and autonomy, with institutions organized on the basis of 
universal, equal and secret voting. Social-Democrats demand the promulgation of a law, 
operative throughout the state, protecting the rights of every national minority in no matter 
what part of the state. This law should declare inoperative any measure by means of which 
the national majority might attempt to establish privileges for itself or restrict the rights of a 
national minority (in the sphere of education, in the use of any specific language, in budget 
affairs, etc.), and forbid the implementation if any such measure by making it a punishable 
offense (Lenin 1977, 243-251; emphasis mine).  
Meles, having created this political structure, believes that all of those who harbor secessionist 
intentions need to be happy, settle down and embark on developing their ethnic fiefdom. He seems to 
suggest that ―the prison house of nations‖ as Lenin used to refer to Czarist Russia, and Meles himself 
uses it to amplify and describe Haile Selassie‘s and Mengistu‘s Ethiopia, has been destroyed. He 
goes on to assume that the hitherto ―prisoners‖ have all been liberated and are allowed to live within 
their geographically defined territories that has allowed them to establish their respective 
government, develop their culture, speak, teach, learn, and conduct their courts in their respective 
languages. Consistent with this, he would argue, is they have come together and established a federal 
government that has given them equal voice in how it is run. Hence, he seems to conclude, they 
should seize this moment and forge ahead.   
 
The Domination of the Country by the TPLF  
But the question then becomes, has Meles created the federal democratic republic that guarantees the 
protection and advancement of all the rights and privileges of every nation and nationality? During 
his interview with Paul B. Henze, in April 1990, Meles   proclaimed:  
The system the Derg has established must be destroyed or it will destroy the country. All the 
resistance movements must come together and decide what the future of (the) country should be. 
We propose a provisional government made up of all factions and parties and movements, right 
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as well as left. Nobody should be left out. The provisional government should develop a plan for 
a constituent assembly that will write a new constitution. The country will have to be federation 
and there will have to be recognition of the right of every people in it to have autonomy. We can 
no longer have Amhara domination….When we talk about Amhara domination, we mean the 
Amhara of Shoa and the habit of Shoan supremacy that became established in Addis Ababa 
during the last hundred years. This system has to change. The people who think they have a right 
to dominate in Addis Ababa have to change their mentality. This is the mentality the Derg 
adopted from the very beginning. No people of Ethiopia have the right to dominate any other 
(Henze 1990, 5; emphasis mine). 
Various scholars of the Ethiopian politics seem to agree that Ethiopia is a long way away from 
Meles‘ declarations. In fact the hitherto elections and their result  incontrovertibly show that Ethiopia 
is and has been under the domination of a single ethnic group, the Tigreans who constitute only 6 
percent of the population (Habtu 2003,  7) for the last eighteen years. Table1 below shows the 1995, 
2000, and 2005 parliamentary election results and seat allocations to the EPRDF, where the TPLF‘s 
number screams out for attention. 
 
Table 1: Ethiopian Parliamentary Election Results 1995-2005 
Party/Coalition 2005 2000 1995 
Oromo People‘s Democratic 
Organization (OPDO) 
110 183 182 
Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM) 
  87 146 144 
Southern Ethiopia People‘s 
Democratic Movement 
(SEPDM) 
  92 112 125 
Tigray People‘s Liberation 
Front (TPLF) 
  38    40 40 
Total  327/547* 481/547* 491/547* 
Source: Ethiopian Parliament (2005).   
* indicates, of the 547 total seats, EPRDF had ―won‖ 327, 481, and 491 seats for the years      
shown above. 
 
Browyn E. Bruton, International Affairs Fellow in Residence, in her article written on August 6, 
2009, warns the Obama administration about possible catastrophic crisis that is brewing in the Horn 
of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia. She urges President Obama‘s administration to seize the moment 
and avert the impending crisis. Bruton also reminds the administration of the shrinking democratic 
space and the domination of the political sphere in Ethiopia by the Tigrean minority that has 
alienated the majority thereby aggravating the whole situation. She observed that ―….The 
government‘s ruling party, the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is 
perceived by many Ethiopians to be dominated by a single minority ethnic faction, the Tigre, and its 
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consolidation of political power may be read as an assault on the majority ethnic Amhara and Oromo 
population‖ (Bruton 2009, 2-3). 
Professor Marina Ottoway wrote:  
In 1991 the TPLF had power based on its military superiority over the other movements. It 
could not transform such power into political authority without dealing with the ethnic 
problems. As a Tigrean nationalist movement, it had no support in other regions, nor could it 
hope to gain it—Oromos and Amharas could never vote for a party dedicated to the cause of 
Tigrean liberation. In the last period of the war against Mengistu, when the fighting started 
spreading from Tigray to other regions, the TPLF took the first step to address the problem, 
promoting the formation of ethnic movements in other regions and of an umbrella 
organization, the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to bring 
them together. But in 1991 these EPRDF-aligned parties were perceived as tools of the TPLF 
and thus had little legitimacy (Ottaway 2009, 2). 
In organizing the umbrella organization known as the EPRDF, the TPLF formed various satellite 
parties to represent their respective national and regional groups:  the EPDM (Ethiopian People's 
Democratic Movement) represents the Amhara nationality; the OPDO (Oromo People's Democratic 
Organization) represents the Oromo nationality; and the SEPDM (Southern Ethiopian People's 
Democratic Movement) represents the    peoples of the southern region of Ethiopia.  It would not be 
far from the truth to assert that these satellite parties could all be regarded as Trojan horses. They 
were created by the TPLF to help it to mollify the peoples of their respective regions, to have access 
to the natural resources of these same regions and to use them to achieve eventually the political 
domination of the country. Hence I argue here that this could be the very reason why Meles and 
company chose the parliamentary form of government with Prime Minister as head of the 
government and a figurehead president as head of state and not the presidential form that could be 
both the head of government and of state. 
  The burden of winning the premiership in the former form of government is, for the would be 
prime minister, only to win his/her constituency and hope or help others in his/her party win theirs so 
as to secure the majority seat in the parliament. The latter form of government, however, requires 
that the would-be president compete in all the ethnic territories and win a clear majority. With the 
presidential form of government no Tigrean could have won the presidency. It is a simple arithmetic. 
The numbers are not there. Remember, this is an ethnic based federalism. An Oromo or an Amhara 
or a coalition of Oromo-Amhara will dominate the political scene. The two ethnic groups constitute 
better than ―62 per cent of the population‖ (Quoted in Alem Habtu 7). Meles would not allow this to 
happen. He has unconsciously admitted his intention for the ethnically based federalism. 
…this policy serves many interests including equitable distribution of wealth, empowerment of 
ethnicities, and since this was how the nationalities were before colonization, as ethnicity was the 
language they understood best. (He continued to say) ethnic basis of Ethiopia‘s democracy stemmed 
from the government‘s fight against poverty and the need for an equitable distribution of the 
nation’s wealth: peasants must be enabled to make their own decisions in terms of their own culture. 
Power must be devolved to them in ways that they understand, and they understand ethnicity….Other 
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approaches to development had been hegemonic and exploitative and had led to internecine strife 
and civil war (Zenawi 2009, 6; emphasis mine).  
There are two interesting issues in this declaration that are of significant importance.  First, 
Meles has not shown  how the substitution of the  exploitation of the various ethnic groups by the 
Shoa Amharas, an ethnic group he despises with passion, by the Tigreans, to which he belongs, is 
any different if not in form at least in substance? Or was it a Freudian slip that exposed the 
undercurrent? Whatever the motivation, it has been communicated very eloquently but, sadly, 
pungently. 
The second issue is the absence of reasoned argument that explains what “equitable distribution 
of resources” means in the context of federalism. Does it mean that Oromia with its large population 
and significant amount of resources would share its resources equitably with the other regions? 
Should not distribution of resources and /or revenues be contingent upon population and other 
criteria that should not disadvantage the territories that have large population and territory to 
develop? As a unique form of federalism, it is incumbent upon the government to explain what it 
means.  
 Professor Keller who had done an in-depth study of how the federal government in Ethiopia is 
managing its affairs differently from other federal countries seems to suggest that federalism in 
Ethiopia‘s case is a misnomer. He said: 
Also, like central governments in all federal states, it is responsible for the conduct of foreign 
policy, insuring national defense, monetary policy, and setting policy relating to inter-regional 
state transportation and commerce. In spite of the fact that the Constitution gives a great deal of 
power and administrative authority to regional states, the overwhelming amount of political 
power in this system rests with the central government. Because of this, in practice, Ethiopia 
operates more like a unitary state, with regional states closely following the policy lead of the 
center, mainly as represented in the TPLF’s Five year Program rather than asserting their 
policy independence ( Keller 2002, 34, emphasis mine). 
Theodore Vestal, a very distinguished scholar describing Oromo People‘s Democratic Organization 
and the other appendages observed: 
In every regional government, a shadow party organization operated as a disciplined phalanx to 
carry out the will of the EPRDF leadership….Important decisions are made by party leaders 
behind closed doors. Not a single important political or organizational question is decided by 
government officials or mass organizations without guiding direction from the party. The Front 
(TPLF) stands above all, and the leaders do not test their policies in a forum of free speech and 
fair elections. Instead they mobilize and enforce consent (Vestal 2009, quoted in the US Bureau 
of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 4-5).   
Another scholar, Dr. Seyoum Hameso, after having critically assessed the situation, contended that 
even though the TPLF promised and championed collective rights, the use of one‘s language, the 
decentralization of power and the provision of regional autonomy, the promise and hope was short 
lived as the TPLF wanted to entrench itself as an Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Front (Hameso 
2001, 1).  Dr. Berhanu G. Balcha, on writing about the shortcoming of the Meles regime, seems to 
suggest that because the TPLF represents a minority ethnic group in the Ethiopian polity, it would 
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not of necessity establish a democratic federal government. To do so, he seems to argue, would be 
tantamount to committing suicide. He said that the TPLF is aware that Tigreans constitute only 6 
percent of the Ethiopian people as compared to the Oromos and Amhars who constitute 35 percent 
and 30 percent respectively (Balcha 2009, 3). Balcha continued to argue that this reality has 
compelled the TPLF to devise another route. 
 Instead of establishing genuine ethnic federal arrangement and genuine ethnic coalition 
government, it has opted to join forces with sycophants that have no legitimacy in their ethnic 
communities and establish its hegemony (Balcha 2009, 3).  In order to guarantee the domination of 
Ethiopia by the TPLF, a front of a minority ethnic group, it appears that Meles has devised a unique 
form of government machinery. It is a government that appeals and entices the intellectuals of 
various ethnic groups who have no qualm of not only accepting to play a secondary role but also to 
permanently relegating the rights, privileges and aspirations of ―their people‖ to a secondary and 
possibly tertiary importance.  
The statute of the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front approved by the Sixth 
Congress of the EPRDF declares that ―EPRDF is a Front founded by the union of revolutionary 
democratic organizations. It is not a Front (that is) organized by recruiting individuals‖ (Ethiopian 
People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front Statute, Art. 7, Sect.1a). The Statute in its introduction 
declares the importance of establishing multi-national organization as follows: Since Ethiopia is a 
multi-national country, the way to guide its different nationalities and peoples together for the 
struggle should be through a Front made up of multi-national member organizations, and not in an 
organizational framework of individuals. Because the Front consisting of multi-national 
organizations will fulfill two basic questions: 
      a.  Ethiopian nations and nationalities by forming an organization based upon nations and           
 nationalities of their own are practically showing the will their rights and benefits be             
 protected in a fundamental way. The current situation indicates that nations and 
nationalities could secure a better organizational leadership and political participation 
when they are in struggle under the leadership of nations and nationality organizations of 
their own. As thus each nationality, under a respective national organization will improve the 
condition for the respect of their rights and benefits. EPRDF, being an organization of     
nations and nationalities and dedicated to the respect of rights and values of Ethiopian 
nations and nationalities, should embrace organizations that are formed on the basis of 
nations and nationalities to protect the rights and benefits of nations and nationalities. 
b.   National organizations are organizations that are formed in order to protect the rights and   
       benefits of their nations and nationalities under the revolutionary democratic program.         
       Keeping this in mind, the formation of organizations of nations and nationalities that are       
       governed by the democratic objectives which foster fraternity and unity among different        
       organizations is fundamental. The formation of nations and nationality organizations under  
       one revolutionary democratic Front will be the better choice to realize this objective. So, as  
       EPRDF is an organization which stands to secure equality and unity among the peoples of   
       Ethiopia, it realizes the objective by embracing member organizations that are dedicated to  
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       protect the rights and also gain support from their people easily (ibid, Sections 2a and b,      
       emphasis mine). 
 
One may ask what EPRDF‘s assumption was when it authored its statute? What have these 
authors taken for granted? The assumption is, it is obvious, that EPRDF is the sole representative of 
all of the nations and peoples of Ethiopia. They have also taken for granted that EPRDF‘s power 
cannot be curtailed or questioned by any governmental body or organ including the High Court of the 
country. Consciously and/or unconsciously the authors have also assumed that the statute could 
trample not only the constitution of the country but also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
with impunity. However, according to international law, if a country is a party to an international 
law, treaty or agreement, which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is, then, the government 
that is a signatory party to the law has the obligation to make sure that all the provisions   in its 
constitution pertaining to human rights should be consistent with or be complementary to the former. 
If and when there is any contradiction or inconsistency between the two, then the government is 
required to amend its laws accordingly.  
Now then, it is clear that the statute of the EPRDF does not only negate Article 31 of  its own 
constitution, the provision that guarantees the right of everyone to form an association for whatever 
purpose, but also Article 21 sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Section 1 guarantees everyone  
…the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives, section two guarantees everyone the right to equal access to public service in his 
country, and section three declares the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures (Carter and Trimble 1991, 877-878).   
Now the question is, if the government, in this case EPRDF, circumscribes and limits the right of the 
Ethiopian people, through proclamation, how then will they exercise their ―free choice,‖ have ―equal 
access to public service in their country‖ and express their will periodically in a genuine election, as 
demanded by sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? It is 
evident that the government has infringed upon their right by restricting them to vote to 
organizations they had no say in their creation. How could this system of voting be regarded as free 
and democratic and be the basis upon which the authority and legitimacy of the government rests? 
Simply put, because the government has taken the liberty and the power to dictate to the people, it 
has robbed them of their sovereign right and power to be the foundation of democratic governance. 
The statute is also in contradiction with Article 25 section ―A‖ of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights that encourages everyone ―to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.‖ Here again, the same problem comes to light. There cannot 
be free choice as long as the government circumscribes how the people are to be organized and ipso 
facto negate their right to free choice. The statute, the working and guiding principle of the EPRDF, 
has given the government the power to promulgate all laws and policies that protect and advance its 
narrow interests. No wonder why the Parliament adopted a very controversial decree that robbed 
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nongovernmental organizations, including political organizations, the right to receive financial 
assistance or contributions from foreign sources.  
By emphatically and categorically stating that ―…it is not the job of NGOs to protect the rights of 
citizens,‖ the government is unabashedly saying its power over its people has no bound. Peter 
Heinlein of the Voice of America observed that the Ethiopian Parliament approved a law on January 
6, 2009, that criminalizes many NGO activities. He wrote: 
Ethiopia‘s parliament has overwhelmingly approved a law that will sharply restrict the activities 
of most civil society groups. The law has been the target of scathing criticism from opposition 
parties, rights groups and many foreign governments, including the United States. The ruling 
Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Party used its massive parliamentary majority to 
push through a law that gives the government broad powers over foreign funded 
nongovernmental organizations. The so-called Charities and Societies Proclamation prohibits 
any group receiving at least 10 percent of its funds from abroad from promoting democratic or 
human rights, the rights of children, or equality of gender or religion. Violators could face stiff 
fines and sentences of up to 15 years in prison (Heinlein 2009, 1-2). 
Among the NGOs that are targeted by this law is the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Its declared function is to:  
...strengthen the capacity and role of civil society, improve independent human rights monitoring, 
investigation, and reporting, and work to improve the respect the judiciary and police have for 
international, national, and institutional human rights regulations…also strengthen the federal 
and regional parliaments operating in the new, multiparty environment, and build the capacity of 
national and regional judicial training centers and select law schools (USAID Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Ethiopia 2009, 2). 
As it has been noted above, the ―constitution‖ has all the rights, including the bill of rights and is 
supposed to protect and guard against governmental excesses and violation rights. The record of the 
FDRE regarding the violation of human rights is well-documented. Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and all other advocates of human rights have incessantly produced evidence to this 
effect.     
 
Authoritarianism of the TPLF/EPRDF 
How does Ethiopia fare in its peacefulness and protection of human rights among the community of 
nations? This is no longer left to an individual subjective evaluation or whims. The Global Peace 
Index has tried to scientifically and objectively measure not only nations‘ relative peacefulness but 
also their adherence to the protection of human rights by critically examining and assessing issues 
that are pertinent to the topic. In this connection, Global Peace Index ranks Ethiopia 121
st
 out of 144 
countries for the year 2009; and 121
st
 out of 140 countries for the year of 2008; and 103
rd
 out of 121 
countries for the year of 2007 (Global Peace Index 2009, 5). As Table 2 below indicates, amongst    
the many indicators GPI used, I have taken the liberty to select the most pertinent ones for this 
purpose. Is there any wonder, therefore, that Prime Minister Meles is ranked seventeenth amongst 
world‘s worst dictators? (Parade 2007, 1).   
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Table 2: The Global Peace Index  
(Peace Index scores from 1 to 5 where 1= most peaceful) 
Indicators 2009 2008 2007 
Political Instability 3.5 3.25 3.25 
Respect for Human Rights 4 3 4 
Political Participation 5 5 5 
Civil Liberties 4.41 4.4 4.4 
Political Democracy Index 4.52 4.5 4.7 
Likelihood of Violent Demonstration 4 4 4 
Electoral Process 3 3 4 
Functioning of Government 3.93 3.9 3.9 
Level of Organized Conflict Internal 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Relations with neighboring countries  3 3  
Source:  Global Peace Index, 2009. 1-2. 
 
Due to the fact that 85 percent of Ethiopia‘s population is rural whose livelihood is based on 
subsistence farming, their ability to contribute financial assistance and/or pay monthly dues to a 
political party of their choice is very limited if not impossible. The relatively small percent of the 
middle class not only has been eroded and reduced through forced and/or voluntary exile, but also 
has been impoverished due to inflation, unemployment and under-employment. Hence it cannot be a 
reliable source of financial contributions. 
 This, therefore, means that the organizations will be, ipso facto, dependent on Ethiopian 
Diasporas for their financial support. It goes without saying therefore that, to criminalize financial 
assistance or contributions from foreign sources, as the Parliament has done, and eloquently 
discussed by Peter Heinlein of the Voice America above, is, in the opinion of many, tantamount to 
condemning the country to one party domination and dictatorship. It is obvious that this will only 
serve the interest of the government whose party has not only had absolute control of the country, but 
also the unique opportunity of safeguarding the treasury of the same.  
As argued above, the EPRDF statute contradicts Article 25 section ―A‖ of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights that guarantees the rights of individuals or groups of individuals to 
establish an organization of their choosing. By so doing, it, in-effect, restricts their right to vote for 
an organization composed of groups of individuals that are motivated by common ideals, goals, 
aspirations, dreams and visions for their country. In other words, groups and individuals that want to 
transcend narrow nationalism or parochialism and establish organizations based on other metrics or 
priorities will not be able to do so. 
It is possible to postulate that if and when organizations are ethnically based and are represented 
in parliament accordingly; their working relationship would be one of competition. The fact that they 
have been forced to organize themselves ethnically means that there will be suspicion and mistrust 
amongst them. The ethnic groups that constitute the absolute majority in the parliament, in this case 
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the elements that constitute the EPRDF will not have the incentive or the desire to want to cooperate 
and work with the other ethnically organized parties. This is exactly what is happening in the EPRDF 
dominated parliament in Ethiopia. The relationship that obtains between the various ethnic groups in 
the parliament is antagonistic. This modus operandi will contribute to undermining Ethiopians, 
thereby weakening national consciousness.    TPLF dominated EPRDF has not created a government 
that ended ethnic domination as Meles had pledged to Paul Henze. 
 
Conclusion 
As this study shows, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was born out of mistrust and 
suspicion between the people and the TPLF led government. Although the TPLF/EPRDF has tried to 
get legitimacy for its constitution, it has not materialized as of yet. The course of action that is 
needed is for the TPLF to make serious assessment and soul searching. The leadership needs to 
summon its genuine courage and consider earnestly the extent to which its biases, prejudices, and 
worldview have played a role in its decision to superimpose an ethno-linguistic federal paradigm on 
the Ethiopian people. 
  It has always been the contention of the TPLF, according to Berhe, that the effort of the 
Tigrean people to form its national state has been frustrated by the dominant Amhara nation (Berhe, 
1981, 4). By holding the ―Amhara nation,‖ primarily the Shoan Amhara, as the culprit for the 
oppression of all ―nations and nationalities‖ in the ―empire,‖ the TPLF has embarked on a systematic 
destruction of the national consciousness, sowing the seed of discord amongst people who have lived 
for centuries in relative harmony intermingling and intermarrying between and across ethnic lines. 
Meles needs to be true to his own constitution and empower the Ethiopian people by vesting 
them with their inalienable right to sovereignty. This demand is both legitimate and democratic. The 
call for this demand transcends nationality and/or ethnicity. All peace loving and democratic forces 
can rally around this call. The May 2005 election and its aftermath had exposed the brute, callous, 
and authoritarian nature of the TPLF regime. The TPLF cannot claim to have established the 
―Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia when, in fact, it is neither democratic nor republic in 
substance.        
The  United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in its Human Development Report 2002, 
under the subheading ―Deepening democracy in a Fragmented world‖ contend that the central 
challenges for deepening democracy is building the key institutions of democratic governance. They 
include: 
 the existence of a well functioning political parties and interest associations,  
 a system of checks and balances based on the separation of powers with independent 
judicial and legislative branches,  
 a vibrant civil society able to monitor government and private business, 
 a free and independent media, and  
 effective civilian control over the military and other security forces   
                   (UNDP 2002, 4). 
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The above prerequisites are either non-existent or are under very close supervision and 
surveillance by the FDRE. The authoritarian nature of the TPLF/EPRDF has been discussed earlier 
in this analysis. Human Rights Watch in 2009, under the heading ―Ethiopia: Events of 2009” 
contend that the Meles‘ government has continued to shrink the space within which the independent 
civil society was operating thereby affecting its activities. This measure, according to HRW, has 
made it the most restrictive of any comparable law anywhere in the world. Continuing with its 
censorship of the government, Human Rights Watch said that the new media law it passed in 2008 
not only restricts the space but also constrains the activities of journalists. It also lampoons the 
government for continuing the lengthy periods of pretrial and pre-charge detention to punish critics 
and opposition activists and also for torturing and abusing the same (Human Rights Watch 2009, 1-
2).  It is therefore evident that TPLF/EPRDF is far away from being democratic. Unless and until aid 
donors make their development assistance to Ethiopia contingent on the building of the key 
institutions of democratic governance, the Millennium Development Goals, as will be discussed 
below, will not be met by the FDRE. Tom Porteous the Human Rights Watch, in his article under the 
heading Ethiopia: the Aid-Politics Trap wrote: 
Ethiopia is the largest recipient of western development assistance in Africa. In 2005-08, aid to 
Ethiopia more than doubled-from $1.9 billion to $3.4 billion. Yet the country‘s domestic politics 
are becoming less democratic and more repressive. Could there be a link between aid and 
repression? … Ethiopia is a de facto one-party state masquerading as a democracy. Its ruling 
party, the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), permeates the state and 
goes to great lengths to ensure citizens‘ political loyalty. In parliamentary elections in May 2010, 
the EPRDF won 99.6% of the seats. In local elections in 2008 it won more than 99% ….Now, 
HRW‘s research indicates that the coercive mechanisms by which the EPRDF maintains control 
of the country have come to include the politicization and manipulation of aid. The report 
documents numerous instances of government officials distributing and withholding the benefits 
of donor-funded programmes-such as fertilizers, agricultural seeds, food, microcredit, and job 
and training opportunities-on the basis of party affiliation (Porteous 2010, 1-2).    
 
With all the political problems that have been bedeviling the country for the last eighteen years, it 
would be extremely difficult for the government of Prime Minister Meles to be able to discharge its 
obligations and responsibilities as outlined by the heads of state and government of members of the 
United Nations in their Millennium Development Goals in 2000 (UNDP 2002, 17). The International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in their Plan for the 2009-2010 have the 
following to say about the dire situation that faces Ethiopia.  
Currently ranking 169 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index, Ethiopia is 
facing complex challenges ranging from a huge population growth (resulting in a very young 
population with 44 percent being under 15 years) high illiteracy rates, and tremendous health 
challenges with malaria, meningitis, and HIV and AIDS being the major killers. Access to clean 
water and sanitation facilities are severely limited, with 78 percent of the total population not having 
access to safe drinking water. In addition, Ethiopia is among the most disaster prone countries in 
Sub- Saharan Africa regularly affected by severe drought, floods, as well as political unrests and 
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 Due to a high population density and the repeated exposure to natural disasters, Ethiopia 
chronically suffers from food insecurity. Environmental degradation and sever effects of climate 
change make food security one of the main priorities for humanitarian assistance in the country 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, Plan 2009-2010, Ethiopia, 1). 
Mark Malloch Brown, the administrator of the UNDP, on writing the forward to the Human 
Development Report, stresses the importance of political empowerment of the people to economic 
development. In his words: 
This Human Development Report is first and foremost about the idea that politics is as important 
to successful development as economics. Sustained poverty reduction requires equitable 
growth—but it also requires that poor people have political power. And the best way to achieve 
that in a manner consistent with human development objectives is by building strong and deep 
forms of democratic governance at all levels of society (Human Development Report 2002 
UNDP, V). 
What any serious statesman and astute student of politics can learn from peoples uprisings in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and possibly Syria is that no matter how long the peoples‘ yearning for 
liberty, respect, and dignity are suppressed, the time will come when the internal conditions and the 
external environment will allow them to decide the measure they need to take. What were considered 
as suppression were in fact smoldering until the time was ripe for a small provocation to ignite them 
into a burning flame. In this connection, the dreams and aspirations of the Ethiopian people are not 
any different from the people of the countries referenced earlier. But will they take the same route? 
That is for the future to determine. 
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